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SUMMERLIN V. STEWART AND RING RETROACTIVITY
TONYA G. NEWMAN*
INTRODUCIION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a trial by an impartial jury to
all persons accused of a crime.' This right to be judged by one's peers
is a cornerstone of the criminal justice system. Citing the deprivation
of the right to trial by jury among King George's offenses, 2 those who
signed the Declaration of Independence recognized the right as an
"invaluable heritage [which was] firmly established as a juridical fac-
tor long before the rise of the United States."' The framers of the
United States Constitution shared the view, believing that a trial be-
fore a jury of one's peers was a crucial element of the fair dispensa-
tion of justice.4 In fact, so central was the right to trial by jury that the
framers included the right not only in the Bill of Rights, but also in
the body of the Constitution itself.5 However, prior to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona,6 five states de-
nied capital murder defendants the right to have a jury make factual
determinations in sentencing, and an additional four states allowed
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2005;
B.A., History, University of Louisville, 2001. I am particularly grateful to Professor Margaret
Stewart for her insightful comments and suggestions, and to Dr. Thomas Mackey for his en-
couragement through the years. Finally, I dedicate this Comment to Charlie, in recognition and
appreciation of his unfailing support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. JOHN GUINTHER. THE JURY IN AMERICA 31 (1988).
3. MAXIMUS A. LESSER, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURY SYSTEM 151
(William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1894); see also, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151
(1968) ("[B]y the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases had been in
existence in England for several centuries and carried impressive credentials traced by many to
Magna Carta.").
4. Alexander Hamilton noted that the attendees of the Constitutional Convention agreed
on the necessity of trial by jury, although for different reasons. Some held it "as a valuable
safeguard to liberty," while others held it in even greater esteem, "as the very palladium of free
government." THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 498 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
6. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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the jury to render an advisory verdict in capital cases and reserved to
the judge the ultimate sentence determination. 7
In the culmination of a line of cases evaluating the respective
roles of juries and judges in factfinding and 'sentencing, the Ring
Court held that its recent decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey" dictated
that a jury, must decide the factual issue of whether the prosecution
has proven the existence of statutory aggravated circumstances that
make a capital defendant eligible for the death penalty.9 The Court
therefore held unconstitutional Arizona's capital sentencing scheme,
to the extent that it "allow[ed] a sentencing judge, sitting without a
jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of
the death penalty." 10
The ruling in Ring was necessarily a narrow one, as Ring chal-
lenged his sentence on narrow grounds. Ring did not challenge the
statutory aggravating circumstances themselves," made no claim re-
garding mitigating circumstances,2 and did not argue that a jury must
"make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death pen-
alty.""3 Nor did Ring argue that his indictment was defective for fail-
7. Id. at 608 n.6. Arizona, Idaho, Nebraska, Montana and Colorado required judicial
determination of aggravating circumstances necessary for the imposition of the death sentence,
while Florida, Alabama, Indiana and Delaware employ a hybrid capital sentencing scheme
whereby the jury renders an advisory verdict while the judge makes the final sentence determi-
nation. Id.
8. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The Apprendi Court held that a judge may not make factual find-
ings that increase the defendant's sentence beyond that for which he or she is eligible based on
the jury's verdict. Id. at 490. "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
9. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
10. Id. The Court therefore specifically overruled the portion of Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639 (1990), which held that aggravating factors were not elements of an offense but were
instead only sentencing considerations guiding the choice between life and death. Ring, 536 U.S.
at 609.
11. The sentencing judge found as aggravating circumstances that Ring "committed the
offense in expectation of receiving something of 'pecuniary value,"' and that Ring committed
the murder "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." Ring, 536 U.S. at 594-95.
Reviewing the sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, holding that
while Ring did not commit the offense in a depraved manner, he did expect to make a "pecuni-
ary gain." Id. at 596. Thus, the Supreme Court noted that Ring did not challenge the Court's
prior holding in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which held that a
judge may make the factual finding that a defendant has a prior conviction, even if such a find-
ing increases the sentence for which the defendant is eligible. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4.
12. In imposing the death sentence, Ring's sentencing judge found as the only mitigating
factor "Ring's 'minimal' criminal record," which did not weigh heavily enough against the
aggravating circumstances to "call for leniency." Ring, 536 U.S. at 595. On review, the Arizona
Supreme Court re-weighed the factors and affirmed the sentence. Id. at 596. Ring also did not
challenge the court's authority to re-weigh the factors. Id. at 598 n.4.
13. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4.
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ing to allege the existence of aggravating circumstances. 14 However,
because of Ring's narrow scope, the Court failed to speak to an issue
of critical importance to many death row inmates sentenced according
to capital sentencing statutes similar to Arizona's: may they raise a
Ring challenge on collateral review?
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently answered this ques-
tion affirmatively in Summerlin v. Stewart.15 The Summerlin court
held that the rule announced in Ring was a substantive rule 16 and
therefore is "presumptively retroactive."17 To date, only the United
States District Court for the District of Nebraska has agreed, in its
recent decision in Palmer v. Clarke.18 The Ninth Circuit further held
that despite Teague v. Lane's 9 presumptive bar against retroactively
applying new rules of criminal procedure, Ring falls within Teague's
second exception and therefore applies retroactively on collateral
review.2° In so holding, the Ninth Circuit departed from both federal
and state courts that have directly addressed the question. For exam-
ple, the Eleventh Circuit held in Turner v. Crosby" that Ring an-
nounced a new procedural rule and did not apply retroactively to
Florida's advisory capital sentencing scheme.22 Likewise, the Arizona
Supreme Court held in State v. Towery23 that Ring announced a
14. Id. at 598 n.4.
15. 341 F.3d 1082, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub nom., Schriro v. Summerlin,
124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
16. Id; see also id. at 1102 (holding that "... Ring is, as to Arizona, a 'substantive' deci-
sion..."); id. at 1106 (describing Ring as having "an inescapably substantive impact in Ari-
zona...").
17. Id. at 1099.
18. 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1055 (D. Neb. 2003). Nebraska has filed an amicus curae brief
with the Supreme Court in Schriro v. Summerlin. Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Illi-
nois, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
and Virginia joined Nebraska's brief. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nebraska, et al., Schriro v.
Summerlin, No. 03-526, 2004 WL 99341 (Jan. 15, 2004); see also
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/03-526.htm (last visited April 4, 2004).
19. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
20. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1108, 1120, 1121.
21. 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003).
22. Id. at 1280, 1282, 1283, 1284. The Eleventh Circuit did not reach the merits of Turner's
argument that Ring made unconstitutional Florida's "hybrid" capital sentencing structure,
which requires the jury to render an "advisory verdict to the trial judge," by which the trial
judge is not bound. The Turner court explained that it need not reach the merits first because
Turner was "procedurally barred from bringing a Ring claim" and second because it held Ring
to be non-retroactive. Id. at 1280.
For an argument that the Court should replace the Teague doctrine with a procedural
default rule, see Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative
to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 203 (1998).
23. 64 P.3d 828 (Ariz. 2003).
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purely procedural rule.24 With the exception of the Ninth Circuit in
Summerlin and the district court in Palmer, courts have uniformly
held that as a procedural rule, Ring does not apply retroactively on
collateral review.25 As a result, these courts have held that death row
inmates sentenced under unconstitutional capital sentencing statutes,
whose convictions became final before June 24, 2002,26 have no con-
stitutional remedy. Citing the rules of retroactivity, these courts hold
that the interests of finality and deterrence underlying those rules are
entitled to greater weight when balanced against a defendant's inter-
est in availing himself or herself of a recognized constitutional right.
Given the split among the circuits, the Supreme Court granted
Arizona's Department of Corrections' petition for a writ of certiorari
in Summerlin.27 The Court will answer two questions presented for
review. First, the Court will answer whether the Ninth Circuit erred
"by holding that the new rule announced in Ring is substantive, rather
than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity analysis
of Teague v. Lane. ' 28 Second, the Court will decide whether the
Summerlin court erred when it held that as a procedural rule, Ring
satisfied the requirements of the second Teague exception and there-
fore does apply retroactively on collateral review.29
This Comment examines the Ninth Circuit's rationale for holding
that Ring applies retroactively on collateral review as both a substan-
tive and a procedural rule, and suggests that the Supreme Court
should affirm the Ninth Circuit. First, Part I will discuss the applicable
doctrines of retroactivity and their underlying principles. After estab-
lishing this retroactivity framework, Part II will place Ring and its
predecessors within that framework, discussing the Supreme Court's
holdings in the line of cases directly addressing the nature of "sen-
tencing factors" as elements of an offense requiring a jury's factual
determination. The Ring line of cases reveals the Court's recognition
of the jury's fundamental role and its demand that states not erode
24. Id. at 832-33.
25. See, e.g., Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003); Zeigler v. Crosby,
345 F.3d 1300, 1312 n.12 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002);
United States. v. Battle, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1101, 1102 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
26. The Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona on this date.
27. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003). The Court heard oral arguments on April
19, 2004.
28. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schriro v. Summerlin (No. 03-526), 2003 WL 22429229
(Sept. 23, 2003); Schriro, 124 S. Ct. 833.
29. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schriro v. Summerlin (No. 03-526), 2003 WL 22429229
(Sept. 23, 2003); Schriro, 124 S. Ct. 833.
[Vol 79:755
SUMMERLIN V. STEWART AND RING RETROACTIVITY
that role by relying on sentencing factors. This Comment will then
turn to Summerlin v. Stewart itself, first summarizing its facts and pro-
cedural posture in Part III, then, in Parts IV and V, addressing the
majority's analysis. Part IV will discuss and analyze the majority's
holding that Ring announced a new substantive rule and, therefore,
applies retroactively on collateral review. This section will compare
the Ninth Circuit's analysis to Judge Rawlinson's analysis in dissent,
to the Palmer court's analysis, and finally to other courts' conflicting
holdings. Next, Part V will discuss the second prong of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's analysis, in which the court correctly held that as a new rule of
criminal procedure, Ring overcomes Teague's presumptive bar
against retroactive application on collateral review. This section will
again compare the majority's analysis to that of the dissent and to
those of other courts. This section of the Comment will also discuss
the role of juries in safeguarding of accuracy and fairness, a well-
established and constitutionally mandated role that is implicit in our
concept of ordered liberty. Finally, the Comment will conclude in
Part VI by suggesting that the Supreme Court should return to the
principles underlying the Teague doctrine, which evolved to protect
the interests of finality and efficiency in the criminal justice system.
Those interests cannot prevail against society's, and an accused's,
interest in a constitutionally valid death sentence, which includes a
jury verdict that considers every element of the charged offense of
capital murder.
I. THE APPLICABLE DOCTRINES OF RETROACTIVITY
A. The Principles Underlying Retroactivity Doctrine
The Court crafted its current retroactivity doctrine, which ad-
dresses whether a new rule applies to cases preceding that rule, in
order to serve the purpose of habeas corpus, while recognizing the
difficulties posed by a substantial increase in the filing of habeas peti-
tions. The basic framework of the doctrine can easily be summarized:
new rules of criminal procedure are presumptively non-retroactive on
collateral review, 0 while new substantive rules do apply retroactively
30. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). However, new rules of




on collateral review.3' This distinction between criminal procedural
rules and substantive rules underscores and furthers the goals of ha-
beas corpus itself: "[T]o assure that no [person] has been incarcerated
under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the
innocent will be convicted. '32 New substantive rules are therefore
retroactive because they either redefine the elements of a substantive
offense or place certain conduct beyond the authority of the legisla-
ture to proscribe, and thus increase the likelihood that an accused is
incarcerated for conduct no longer considered criminal.33 Conversely,
new procedural rules raise no similar concerns unless they greatly
increase the "likelihood of an accurate conviction." 34
However, the question of whether to apply decisions retroac-
tively on habeas review was not subjected to a great deal of debate
until the Warren Court's many decisions changing criminal proce-
dure.35 As that Court issued increasing numbers of new rules recog-
nizing criminal defendants' procedural rights,36 federal courts received
correspondingly increased numbers of habeas petitions as inmates
sought to avail themselves of the new rules.37 Consequently, the addi-
tional interests of assuring that at some point litigation ceases and
criminal verdicts and sentences become final became a part of the
31. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998).
32. Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
33. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620; Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1054 (D. Neb. 2003).
34. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 313) (internal quotation omitted).
35. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965) ("At common law there was
no authority for the proposition that judicial decisions made law only for the future. Blackstone
stated the rule that the duty of the court was not to 'pronounce a new law, but to maintain and
expound the old one."' (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 69 (15th ed.
1809))). The Court noted that Blackstone was not alone in what he understood to be the court's
role; Sir Matthew Hale expressed a similar view in HISTORY OF COMMON LAW. Id. at 623 n.7
(citing GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 206 (1st ed. 1909)). See also Kuhn v. Fair-
mont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) ("I know of no authority in this court to say that in
general state decisions shall make law only for the future. Judicial decisions have had retrospec-
tive operation for near a thousand years.").
36. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-79 (1966) (holding that the prosecution
may not use a defendant's inculpatory or exculpatory statements without demonstrating the use
of procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-incrimination); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (holding that the use of a co-conspirator in obtaining a state-
ment in a post-indictment, extrajudicial setting, denies a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 344-45 (1963) (hold-
ing that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in all criminal cases); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule applies against the states).
37. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 506 n.183 (1963) (noting that between 1950 and 1961, the number of
state prisoners' habeas petitions filed increased from 560 to 906).
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retroactivity debate.3" Finality served the interest of society as well as
of the defendant because, in most cases, once a defendant and society
were assured that a verdict and sentence were final, both could focus
on preparing the defendant to eventually assume "a useful place in
society."39 The increase in the number of habeas petitions also con-
cerned states because, as the potential for relitigation of issues on
collateral review increased when the Court announced new proce-
dural rules, so too did the potential costs. 40 Clearly, continued relitiga-
tion would require the state to expend resources that it could direct
elsewhere in the criminal justice system.4" Moreover, the likelihood of
conviction on retrial would decrease, as the state would likely neces-
sarily rely on stale evidence. 42 Thus, this unbalanced system of in-
creased habeas petitions and burdens on the states resulting from the
new rules demanded a solution.
B. New Procedural Rules and Retroactivity
With these principles and concerns in mind, and to understand
their bearing on habeas petitioners' ability to take advantage of new
procedural rules, it is helpful to trace how the Court developed its
retroactivity doctrine, noting especially the Court's first attempts to
serve both the purposes of habeas review and the competing interests
involved. Therefore, this Section will examine the competing theories
of the judicial role in creating new law, one of which the Court ac-
cepted and incorporated into its first rule on retroactivity. This Sec-
tion will explain the criticisms of that rule, which the Court
recognized and responded to by reformulating the rule into today's
Teague doctrine. The Teague doctrine attempts to re-balance the
same underlying principles: deterring lower courts from violating es-
tablished rules, protecting the criminal defendants' interest in justice,
38. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting the need for a "visible end to the litigable aspect of the criminal
process [because] [f]inality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain
view").
39. Id. (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963)).
40. Id. at 691. The Court voiced concern that relitigation causes a
drain on society's resources [which] is compounded by the fact that issuance of the ha-
beas writ compels a State that wishes to continue enforcing its laws against the success-
ful petitioner to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through presentation of






and achieving finality to preserve judicial resources and encourage
rehabilitation to prepare for reentry into society.
At common law, the theory of retroactivity insisted that judges
did not make new law but only discovered the law as it existed, and
"expound[ed] the old [law]."'4" According to the traditional view, be-
cause the law did not change, whether it applied retroactively simply
was not an issue." However, John Austin's competing positivist the-
ory held that judges do make law, "by filling in with judicial interpre-
tation.., the empty crevices of the law. '45 This different theory posed
a thorny retroactivity question, and Austin's theory and its propo-
nents recognized the inherent difficulties that arise when parties and
courts rely on a rule later overturned. If a court later overturned the
rule, did that upset the judgment arrived at in justified reliance on an
existing rule? Positivists argued that cases decided under a rule later
overruled should not be relitigated as a result of the later decision. 6
The theoretical debate over retroactivity assumed greater importance
during the Warren Court for two reasons: First, the Court held that
state prisoners could raise all federal claims on habeas review.4 1 Sec-
ond, the number of state prisoners filing federal habeas petitions
greatly increased, resulting in Supreme Court review of the constitu-
tionality of a number of criminal procedures. 41
Faced with increased filings of habeas petitions and the potential
drain on judicial resources, the Supreme Court in Linkletter v.
Walker49 articulated a rule on retroactivity, adopting the positivist
theory and incorporating into a balancing test those principles that
continue to drive the Court's subsequent retroactivity doctrine: the
interests in finality of decisions (which encompass the interests of the
43. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622-23 (1965) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
35, at 69).
44. Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative
Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1077-78 (1999); see supra note 35.
45. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623-24.
46. Id. at 624-25.
47. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub
nom., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003) (noting that "[b]y 1953, the Supreme Court
confirmed the cognizability of all federal constitutional claims filed by state prisoners" (citing
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953))).
48. Id. (citing Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 21-22 (1956)). Schaefer dismisses the theory that the increase in state prisoner habeas
filings resulted solely from the Supreme Court's expansion of the scope of habeas corpus. In-
stead, Schaefer credits the rise to transformed prison practices (including a decrease in censor-
ship by prison officials, which prevented many habeas petitions), and improved prisoner
literacy. Schaefer, supra, at 21-22.
49. Linkletter, 381 U.S. 618.
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public, the judicial system, and criminal defendants); and private and
official conduct in reliance on the rule later overturned. 0 The result-
ing balance weighed (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the reliance
on the old rule; and (3) the "effect on the administration of justice of
a retrospective application" of the new rule.5
However, the Linkletter test proved difficult to apply and the
doctrine was sharply criticized.5 2 Noting Linkletter's problems, Justice
Harlan suggested a new retroactivity approach in two opinions, which
the Court adopted nearly twenty years later in Griffith v. Kentucky53
and in Teague v. Lane.54 First, Justice Harlan argued in dissent in De-
sist v. United States55 that courts should not apply the Linkletter test to
determine if a new rule should apply retroactively to cases pending on
direct review, because to deny a defendant the benefit of that rule
would be to "depart from [the] basic tradition" of treating "similarly
situated defendants" alike. 6 Harlan argued:
If a 'new' constitutional doctrine is truly right, we should not re-
verse lower courts which have accepted it; nor should we affirm
those which have rejected the very arguments that we have embraced.
Anything else would belie the truism that it is the task of this Court,
like that of any other, to do justice to each litigant on the merits of
his own case.57
Harlan raised this argument again in his concurrence in Mackey
v. United States, 8 arguing that the Court must decide cases in a prin-
50. Id. at 636. The petitioner in Linkletter urged the Court to apply the Mapp exclusionary
rule retroactively. Id. at 619-20. Refusing to do so, the Court noted that the rule's purpose was
to deter lawless police action by requiring the exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence, and
that retroactive application of the rule would not advance that purpose. Id. at 636-37. Similarly,
both accused individuals and states relied on the old rule, and retroactive application of the rule
would not serve the purpose of the old rule. Id. at 637. Finally, the Court noted that retroactive
application of Mapp would seriously disrupt the administration of justice because "[h]earings
would have to be held on the excludability of evidence long since destroyed, misplaced or dete-
riorated. If it is excluded, the witnesses available at the time of the original trial will not be
available or if located their memory will be dimmed." Id.
51. Id. at 636.
52. Critics urged the Court to rethink its approach to retroactivity because of what one
scholar describes as its "incoherent" approach. Roosevelt, supra note 44, at 1091. Illustrating
Linkletter's problem, Professor Roosevelt explains: If two defendants against whom the state
used the same evidence seized in an invalid search were convicted in separate trials, but only
one chose to appeal, only the defendant whose judgment was not yet final when Mapp was
decided would receive its benefit. Id. Thus, Linkletter treated similarly situated defendants
differently based on their decision to appeal and on their procedural posture.
53. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
54. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
55. 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harian, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 258-59.
57. Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
58. 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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cipled manner, deciding like cases alike, and "apply[ing] the law as it
is at the time, not as it once was. '59 Otherwise, the Court abandons its
role and instead becomes a quasi-legislature, choosing whether to
make a rule "wholly or partially retroactive or only prospective as it
deems wise."' 6° A majority of the Supreme Court finally agreed with
Harlan, holding in Griffith v. Kentucky6l that "failure to apply a newly
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review
violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication.
62
Justice Harlan's opinions in Desist and Mackey also influenced
the Court's approach to retroactivity on collateral review, announced
in Teague v. Lane.63 As mentioned above, Harlan criticized the prob-
lems with the Linkletter standard, and the Teague Court itself noted
that the standard led to inconsistent results.64 The petitioner in Teague
raised three arguments, the final of which prompted the Court to dis-
card the Linkletter standard of retroactivity in favor of a test incorpo-
rating the principles articulated by Justice Harlan. 65 To understand
how the Court arrived at its current retroactivity doctrine and to un-
derstand the rule's bearing on Summerlin, it is necessary to examine
Teague's final argument and to analyze the Court's holding in detail.
Such examination and analysis reveal what the Court attempted to
achieve and demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the
rule to Summerlin's case.
59. Id. at 679-81.
60. Id. at 677.
61. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
62. Id. at 322.
63. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 302, 305.
65. Id. at 294-310. The Teague Court disposed of the petitioner's first two arguments
quickly. First, Teague argued that the Court's rule in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986),
should apply retroactively to his case, despite the fact that his conviction became final prior to
its issuance. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294-96. Teague argued that the various concurrences and dis-
sents in McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), "destroyed the precedential effect of Swain
[v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).]" Teague, 489 U.S. at 296. Batson changed the evidentiary
showing necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection. Teague, 489
U.S. at 295. The Court had previously applied the Linkletter test to Batson and held that the
new rule announced should not apply retroactively to cases already final at the time it decided
Batson. Id. (citing Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam)). Thus, despite Teague's
argument that before his case became final the Court had suggested that it should reexamine
the rule under which his case was decided, McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961 (1983), the Court
held that the opinions expressed had no bearing on Teague's case. Teague, 489 U.S. at 296.
Teague also argued that the prosecutor violated his Equal Protection rights under
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). Teague, 489 U.S. at 297. However, the Court refused to
address the merits of Teague's argument, holding instead that the claim was procedurally barred
because Teague failed to raise it at the state court level. Id. at 297-99.
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Teague argued that the rule in Taylor v. Louisiana,66 which re-
quires that a jury venire be drawn from "a representative cross sec-
tion of the community, ' 67 also applies to petit juries.68 Noting that
Teague urged it to apply a new rule, the Court held that it must first
decide whether this new rule, if adopted, should apply retroactively.69
Treating retroactivity as a threshold issue, Justice O'Connor ex-
plained: "[O]nce a new rule is applied to the defendant in the case
announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be applied
retroactively to all who are similarly situated."70 Given the different
results reached by lower courts applying Linkletter, whereby some
defendants on collateral review received the benefit of a new rule
while others did not, the Court recognized the need for a new rule.71
Therefore, the Court sought to avoid such inequitable results by ar-
ticulating a clear rule that lower courts could easily apply and which
"account[ed] for the nature and function of collateral review."72
As noted previously,73 the Court drew heavily from Justice
Harlan's opinions in Desist and Mackey, focusing on the underlying
purposes of habeas review: "reducing the controversy to a final judg-
ment not subject to further judicial revision,"" and deterring state
courts from failing to "conduct their proceedings in a manner consis-
tent with established constitutional standards."75 Proceedings con-
ducted according to constitutional standards ostensibly assure that no
innocent person stands convicted. According to Harlan, these inter-
ests of finality and deterrence most often outweigh the "competing
66. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
67. Id. at 528.
68. Teague, 489 U.S. at 299.
69. Id. at 300.
70. Id. Thus, the Court's rationale for deciding retroactivity at the threshold echoes Justice
Harlan's concern that all new rules apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review. The
only principled difference, therefore, must be the underlying concerns and purposes of habeas
review itself.
71. Id. at 305. The Court offered as an illustration the rule announced in Edwards v. Ari-
zona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1981), in which it held that police may not infer from the fact that a
suspect answered questions that a defendant waived his or her right to counsel during custodial
interrogation. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305. Before the Court held that the rule did not apply retroac-
tively on collateral review, several circuits reached the opposite conclusion, thereby allowing
several defendants the benefit of the rule, while other similarly situated defendants were unable
to take advantage of Edwards. Id.
72. Teague, 489 U.S. at 305.
73. See supra text accompanying note 63.
74. Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83 (1971)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).




interest in readjudicating convictions according to all legal standards
in effect when a habeas petition is filed. ' 76 The Teague Court agreed,
citing the costs of retroactive application of new rules, which usually
outweigh any benefits, 77 and which also detract from the paramount
goal of achieving finality in criminal decisions: "Without finality, the
criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. ' 78 Establishing
a controversial retroactivity rule that values finality, the Teague Court
held that a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure79 does not
apply retroactively to cases already final prior to the new rule's an-
nouncement unless it falls within one of two exceptions, both pro-
posed by Justice Harlan in Mackey and Desist.8°
First, a habeas petitioner may obtain the benefit of a new rule if
it places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, ' 81 or if
the new rule "prohibit[s] imposition of a certain type of punishment
for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." 82 Atkins v.
Virginia83offers a recent example of such a rule. The Atkins Court
held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment precludes states from imposing the death penalty
on mentally retarded offenders. 84
Under the second Teague exception, a new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure applies retroactively if it is a "watershed rule[] of
criminal procedure,"85 which requires that it meets two qualifications.
First, the rule must "alter our understanding of the bedrock proce-
76. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 683).
77. Id. at 310 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 654 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment)).
78. Id. at 309.
79. Teague is limited by its terms to new rules of criminal procedure. Bousley v. United
States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998); Teague, 489 U.S. at 310.
80. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-12. The Court defines a "new" rule as one that "breaks new
ground," "imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government," or that was not
"dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).
The Supreme Court in Bousley v. United States notes that Teague is limited by its terms
to new rules of criminal procedure. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. However, the Bousley Court and
other courts treat the two exceptions as the distinction between substantive and procedural
rules.
81. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692). This exception recognizes
that it would be fundamentally unfair to detain a defendant convicted of behavior no longer
considered criminal.
82. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990).
83. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
84. Id.
85. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
[Vol 79:755
SUMMERLIN V. STEWART AND RING RETROACTIVITY
dural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular
conviction."86 According to Justice Harlan, such a rule is the result of
"time and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of
what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process. '87 Under this
exception, a watershed rule is one that "requires observance of 'those
procedures that.., are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."'' 8
Second, to qualify as a "watershed rule," the rule must "signifi-
cantly improve the preexisting fact-finding procedures, ' 89 which the
Court explained narrows the scope of the exception to "those new
procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
seriously diminished." 9 Because Teague's proposed new rule did not
"undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a conviction
or seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate convic-
tion," the Court held that the rule requiring representative petit juries
is not a "bedrock procedural element" and therefore did not apply
retroactively. 91
Notably, the Court cautioned that very few new rules "so central
to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt.., have yet to
emerge." 92 Gideon v. Wainwright,93 "sweeping" in nature and applica-
ble to "all felony cases, '94 is most often cited as a rule the Court
would have applied retroactively under the Teague doctrine.95 The
Court's caution rings true. Indeed, the Supreme Court has yet to hold
that any new criminal procedural rule applies retroactively under the
second Teague exception. 96 This seemingly insurmountable hurdle is,
in fact, one of the most common criticisms leveled against current
retroactivity doctrine.97
86. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693-94) (emphasis in Teague).
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (internal quotation omitted)).
89. Id. at 312 (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 262).
90. Id. at 313.
91. Id. at 315.
92. Id. at 313.
93. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
94. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997).
95. Id.; Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (noting that to satisfy the second Teague
exception, the rule must have "the primacy and centrality of the rule adopted in Gideon or
other rules which may be thought to be within the exception").
96. United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 529 (2d Cir. 2000) (compiling cases in which
the Supreme Court considered and declined to hold that new rules or proposed new rules satis-
fied the second Teague exception); see also United States v. Swindall, 107 F.3d 831, 835-36 (11th
Cir. 1997); Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1043 (11th Cir. 1994).
97. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts
After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371, 372, 408 (1991) (noting that the general response to
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C. Substantive Rules and Retroactivity
Unlike the new criminal procedural rules discussed above, new
substantive rules presumptively apply retroactively on collateral re-
view.9, The Supreme Court announces a substantive rule when it de-
termines "the meaning of a criminal statute." 99 The Supreme Court in
Bousley v. United States1° explained the distinction between substan-
tive and procedural rules, noting that while it may "plac[e] conduct
'beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to pro-
scribe,"'10 1 it may not itself determine which conduct is criminal.02
Making that determination would intrude upon legislative functions
and thus violate the separation of powers. However, the Court may
clarify the meaning of a statute.103 When the Court does clarify a stat-
ute's meaning, usually by "address[ing] the criminal significance of
certain facts or of the underlying prohibited conduct,"1' the purpose
of habeas corpus becomes clear in distinguishing between procedural
and substantive rules.105 The purpose of habeas corpus is to "assure
that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates
an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted."'
1 6
Such a risk is inherent when the Court announces a substantive rule
that defines the elements of a crime, because of the increased likeli-
hood that a jury convicted the defendant based on fewer or different
elements. Similarly, the risk is also inherent when the Court an-
nounces a new rule that places certain conduct beyond the power of
the legislature to proscribe, because the defendant stands convicted
for conduct no longer considered criminal. In either case, the benefits
Teague was that the "decision sounded the death knell of habeas corpus as a vehicle for the
protection of defendants' rights," and criticizing the dilemma prisoners face in arguing for
application of a new rule to thereby avoid the procedural default bar, while also attempting to
surmount the Teague hurdles to retroactive application of that new rule); Eliot F. Krieger,
Recent Development, The Court Declines in Fairness-Teague v. Lane, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 164, 182 (1990) (predicting that Teague might "effectively slam the door on most federal
review of state criminal cases").
98. See Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 1083 (2002).
99. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998).
100. Id. at 614.
101. Id. at 620 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
102. Id. at 621.
103. This well-established principle can be traced as far back as Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803).
104. Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1055 (D. Neb. 2003) (citing Curtis v. United
States, 294 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 976 (2002)).
105. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620; see also Palmer, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
106. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312).
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of that decision must be available to a defendant seeking collateral
review. 07
II. FROM WALTON TO RING
In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that it could not rec-
oncile its recent holding in Apprendi, that juries rather than judges
must find any fact (except the fact of prior conviction) that increases
"the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maxi-
mum," 108 with that in Walton v. ArizonaA°9 This Section briefly exam-
ines the evolution of the Court's interpretation of the meaning of
sentencing considerations, from Walton to Jones v. United States,"0
Apprendi, and finally to Ring. These cases, along with the retroactiv-
ity doctrine described above, establish the necessary framework
within which to analyze the Ninth Circuit's approach in Summerlin.
Jeffrey Alan Walton was convicted of first-degree murder after
kidnapping a young Marine in order to steal his car."' Walton and his
co-defendants drove their victim into the desert; when they stopped
the car, Walton forced the Marine out, walked him into the desert,
and shot him."2 The victim died nearly a week later, not from the
gunshot, but from dehydration, starvation, and pneumonia. 3 After
the jury found Walton guilty, the trial court conducted a sentencing
hearing and found that both of the alleged aggravating factors were
present," 4 while none of the alleged mitigating circumstances"5
weighed heavily enough to require leniency." 6 Thereafter, the sen-
107. The similarity between substantive rules, which are not subject to the Teague analysis,
and those procedural rules which satisfy the first Teague exception, is striking. See Palmer, 293
F. Supp. 2d at 1053 n.36 (explaining that while some courts treat the substantive-procedural
distinction as a threshold question to determine whether to undertake a Teague analysis, others
treat the first Teague exception as the inquiry of whether the new rule is substantive or proce-
dural).
108. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
109. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
110. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
111. Walton, 497 U.S. at 644-45.
112. Id. at 644.
113. Id.644-45.
114. Id. at 645. The trial court found two aggravating factors. First, the court found that
Walton committed the murder "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner." Id. (quot-
ing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(6) (1989)). Second, the court found that Walton commit-
ted the murder for pecuniary gain. Id. (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(5) (1989)).
115. Id. Walton urged the court to consider as mitigating circumstances (1) his history of
substance abuse; (2) his possible sexual abuse as a child; and (3) his young age at sentencing. Id.




tencing judge sentenced Walton to death.117 After the Arizona appel-
late courts rejected his appeal, Walton argued before the Supreme
Court that aggravating circumstances were elements of an offense and
therefore a jury, rather than a judge, must make factual findings as to
their existence., 18 Walton further argued that by relying on judicial
findings on the existence of aggravating circumstances, state legisla-
tures transferred to judges a portion of juries' Sixth Amendment fact-
finding duties.119 Rejecting Walton's argument, the Court held that
the aggravating circumstances weighed by a judge during a capital
sentencing proceeding were sentencing considerations rather than
elements of an offense. 120
However, Walton was not the Court's final word on the proper
meaning and role of sentencing considerations, and in fact the Court
reexamined its sentencing jurisprudence over the following decade.
The Jones Court noted, and the Apprendi Court held one year later,
that a jury, rather than a judge, must find the facts that increase the
penalty for a crime beyond the statutory minimum.121
In Jones the Court considered a federal carjacking statute that
provided three levels of sentencing based on the crime's impact upon
its victim: up to fifteen years for the basic carjacking offense, up to
twenty-five years if the victim suffers serious bodily injury, and a
maximum of life imprisonment if the victim dies.122 Although Jones
was charged with violating the statute, the indictment failed to specify
whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury, and the jury there-
fore made no findings relative to her injury. 123 However, during the
sentencing hearing the judge found that the victim did in fact suffer
serious bodily injury, and therefore sentenced Jones to twenty-five
117. Id.
118. Id. at 647; see also Brief for Petitioner, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1989) (No. 88-
7351), 1989 WL 430597, at *27 (1989) ("In every conceivable respect but name Arizona's 'ag-
gravating circumstances are the kind of facts traditionally left to juries-facts which spell out the
difference between conviction of a greater or a lesser crime.); id. at *29 (arguing that "'aggravat-
ing circumstances' ... are substantively, as well as structurally, equivalent to the kind of factual
determinations traditionally made by juries in finding the elements of a criminal offense [be-
cause] they encompass issues of actus reus and mens rea").
119. Brief for Petitioner, Walton, 497 U.S. 639, 1989 WL 430597, at *27.
120. Walton, 497 U.S. at 649.
121. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490 (2000).
122. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988, Supp. V)). The Court noted that
Congress amended the statute in both 1994 and 1996. The 1994 amendment increased the possi-
ble range of punishment for those carjacking offenses in which the victim died to include the
death penalty. Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 n.1.
123. Id. at 230-31.
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years of imprisonment on the carjacking count. 24 Reversing Jones'
conviction, the Supreme Court held that the carjacking statute estab-
lished three offenses, distinguished by the degree of injury to the vic-
tim, the elements of which must all be submitted to the jury.
125
Foreshadowing its ruling in Apprendi, the Jones Court noted in a
footnote that both the Fifth and the Sixth Amendments require that
"any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'
1 26
The following year in Apprendi, the Court squarely addressed
the sentencing consideration issue intimated in the Jones footnote.
127
The statute in controversy was the New Jersey hate crime statute,
which elevated a defendant's sentence if the trial judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that "[t]he defendant in committing
the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of
individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation or ethnicity."' 2 A New Jersey grand jury indicted Ap-
prendi for twenty-three counts related to four alleged shootings.
129
During one of the alleged shootings, Apprendi fired several shots into
the home of a neighboring African-American family because, accord-
ing to a later-retracted statement, he opposed African Americans
living in the formerly all-white neighborhood. 30 The indictment, to
which Apprendi eventually pled guilty to three counts, did not allege
that racial animus motivated Apprendi, nor did it reference the New
Jersey hate crime statute.' 31 Although two of the counts were eligible
for hate crime enhancement, the prosecutor agreed to seek the en-
hancement only on the charge related to the shooting into Apprendi's
neighbors' home. 13 2 Whereas without the hate crime enhancement
Apprendi would have been eligible for a sentence of five to ten years
for that count, Apprendi would now be eligible for a sentence of ten
to twenty years imprisonment.'33 The trial court found by a prepon-
124. Id. at 231. The trial court also sentenced Jones to a consecutive five-year sentence for a
firearm offense. Id.
125. Id. at 252.
126. Id. at 243 n.6.
127. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 536 U.S. 466 (2000).




132. Id. at 469-70.
133. Id. at 469, 474.
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derance of the evidence that Apprendi was indeed motivated by ra-
cial animus and sentenced Apprendi to twelve years imprisonment.134
Bringing the constitutionality of judicially determined sentencing
factors back before the Court, Apprendi challenged the constitution-
ality of New Jersey's hate crime statute, arguing that the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments required that the basis for finding that
the statute applied to his case must be proven to a jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. 3 After the New Jersey appellate courts rejected Ap-
prendi's argument, the Supreme Court reversed.136 Reaffirming its
opinion in Jones, the Court held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." '137
Curiously, the Court attempted to reconcile Apprendi with its
prior holding in Walton.138 The Court referred to its earlier explana-
tion of Walton in Jones, where it described the use of sentencing con-
siderations and aggravating factors as aiding the judge in deciding
which sentence, within a jury-determined range of sentences, to im-
pose. 39 In other words, once a jury convicts an accused of murder, the
defendant is eligible for a sentence within a range-life or death.
Thereafter the judge may use aggravating factors and mitigating fac-
tors to decide which sentence to impose. The Court's attempt to rec-
oncile the holdings yielded an absurd result: while a hate crime
statute cannot expose a defendant to a greater sentence than that for
which the jury finds him eligible, a murder statute may expose a de-
fendant to the death sentence before the jury determines the exis-
tence of statutory aggravating factors to make him eligible for death.
Fortunately the Court recognized the irreconcilability of these hold-
ings and, in Ring v. Arizona, overruled Walton to the extent that it
conflicted with Apprendi.
Like Walton, Timothy Stuart Ring was convicted of first-degree
murder. 40 Also like Walton, Ring was sentenced to die after a judge
134. Id. at 471.
135. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioner, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (No. 99-
478), 2000 WL 35843, at *15-20.
136. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471,472, 497.
137. Id. at 490.
138. Id. at 496-97.
139. Id. (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
140. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,591 (2002) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1105(A)
& (B) (West 2001)).
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conducted a sentencing hearing, finding that two aggravating factors
were present, and that the mitigating circumstance did not sufficiently
offset those factors to justify leniency. 141 Echoing Walton's argument,
but supported by intervening cases, Ring argued that the "Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee, made applicable to the States by
the Fourteenth Amendment... requires that the aggravating factor
determination be entrusted to the jury.1 42 However, where Walton
failed, Ring prevailed. The Court recognized that its holding in
Walton was no longer valid in light of its intervening decisions; so-
called "sentencing factors" expose capital and non-capital defendants
alike to greater sentences and therefore constitute elements of greater
offenses, all of which must be submitted to the jury.143 The failure to
do so violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.144
However, if most circuits prevail in their holdings that Ring an-
nounced neither a substantive rule of law nor a "watershed rule" un-
der the Teague doctrine, a death row inmate such as Walton, whose
nearly identical argument was rejected by the Court twelve years be-
fore Ring, would be unable to avail himself of its constitutional pro-
tection. In fact, under most circuits' rulings, Walton himself would be
unable to benefit from the Court's acceptance of his original argu-
ment. 145 The Ninth Circuit's ruling, applying Ring retroactively on
collateral review, correctly avoids that illogical, unsound, and funda-
mentally unfair result. The Supreme Court should, as explained in the
remainder of this Comment, affirm the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Summerlin and hold that Ring v. Arizona applies retroactively on
collateral review.
This Comment, having explained the Court's retroactivity doc-
trine and holdings that sentencing factors are elements, which under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments must be submitted to a jury,
141. Id. at 594-95. Ring's sentencing judge found the same aggravating factors as Walton's
sentencing judge: (1) Ring committed the murder "in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner," Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(6), and (2) Ring committed the murder for pecuni-
ary gain. Id. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F)(5)).
142. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597.
143. Id. at 609; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
144. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
145. In fact, Professor Arkin expressed concern that Teague would lead to just such a result,
noting: "While the interests of finality are all well and good, it is a troubling rule indeed which
permits one person to be executed and another to stay alive simply because of the date on which
a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court is denied." Arkin, supra note 97, at
419. However, it must be noted that Walton's sentence has been reduced to life without the
possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Arizona Department of Corrections,
http://www.adc.state.az.us/DeathRow/DRowTZ.htm (Last visited April 4, 2004).
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will next examine in detail the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Summerlin.
The Comment will first summarize the case's facts and procedural
history, and will then focus in greater detail on the majority opinion,
concurrence, and dissent. Within this framework and in the context of
the doctrines previously explained, the Comment will suggest how the
Supreme Court should answer both questions for which it granted
certiorari.
III. THE FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF SUMMERLIN V.
STEWART
Summerlin was charged with murdering an account investigator
who visited his home to speak with Summerlin's wife regarding an
overdue account. 146 Following psychiatric examinations and negotia-
tions, Summerlin entered an Alford plea.14 However, he later with-
drew the plea after the sentencing judge announced that he would
"not accept the stipulated sentence,"' 148 and engaged in a detailed col-
loquy with Summerlin about the possible thirty-eight and one-half
years sentence Summerlin would face if his plea remained in force. 149
Summerlin's decision to withdraw the plea made him eligible for the
death penalty. 5 0
After a four-day trial, the jury deliberated for little more than
three hours and found Summerlin guilty of "first-degree murder and
sexual assault."'' Judge Marquardt conducted a sentencing hearing,
during which the State established aggravating circumstances by pre-
senting proof of Summerlin's prior assault conviction and relying on
the trial testimony.52 Summerlin presented no mitigating circum-
146. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1084-85 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub
nom., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
147. Id. at 1085-86. An Alford plea allows a criminal defendant to knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently plead guilty to the charged crime while still maintaining his or her innocence of
the offense. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970).
148. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1086-87. The stipulated sentence allowed Summerlin to receive
a sentence of twenty-one years imprisonment in exchange for his guilty plea to second-degree
murder and aggravated assault. Id. at 1086. At this point, the facts of Summerlin's case took a
peculiar turn. His public defender and prosecutor began an amorous affair, and although his
attorney believed she could no longer represent him, she took no steps at this point to accom-
plish her withdrawal from the case. Id. at 1087.
149. Id.
150. Id. Shortly after the hearing, new counsel was appointed to represent Summerlin, and
the Arizona Attorney General's office took over the prosecution of the case. Id. at 1088.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1089.
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stances.'53 Judge Marquardt found two statutory aggravating circum-
stances: first that Summerlin "had a prior felony conviction involving
the use or threatened use of violence on another person," and second,
"that Summerlin committed the offense in an especially heinous,
cruel, or depraved manner."'54
After the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Summerlin's convic-
tions and sentence on direct review,'55 Summerlin unsuccessfully
sought state relief in four post-conviction motions. 56 Summerlin also
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court,
and filed a second amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus on
November 22, 1995, which the district court denied on October 31,
1997.117 The district court also denied Summerlin's subsequent motion
to vacate the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e), 158 but issued a certificate of probable cause, thereby allowing
Summerlin to continue his appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appel-
late Procedure 22(b)(1). 15 9
The Ninth Circuit, speaking through a divided three-judge panel,
affirmed the district court in part and reversed in part, remanding the
case for an evidentiary hearing to determine "whether Judge
Marquardt was competent when he was deliberating on whether to
impose the death penalty."'160 Pending the evidentiary hearing, the
153. Id. at 1089-90 As further evidence of the peculiar facts behind Summerlin's death
sentence, Judge Marquardt "was a heavy user of marijuana" and eventually resigned from the
bench and was disbarred. Summerlin alleged that Judge Marquardt confused some of the facts
of his case with those of another capital murder defendant he sentenced to death on the same
date. Id. at 1090.
154. Id. at 1090.
155. Id. at 1091 (citing State v. Sunmerlin, 138 Ariz. 426 (1983)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) allows a defendant to file a motion to alter or
amend a judgment within ten days after the entry of the judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
159. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1) provides:
In a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises from proc-
ess issued by a state court, or in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, the applicant cannot
take an appeal unless a circuit justice or a circuit or district judge issues a certificate of
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). If an applicant files a notice of appeal, the dis-
trict judge who rendered the judgment must either issue a certificate of appealability
or state why a certificate should not issue. The district clerk must send the certificate or
statement to the court of appeals with the notice of appeal and the file of the district-
court proceedings. If the district judge has denied the certificate, the applicant may re-
quest a circuit judge to issue the certificate.
F. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1).
160. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091 (citing Sunmerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 957 (9th Cir.
2001)). Sunmerlin accused Judge Marquardt of confusing the facts of his case with those of
another capital defendant whom Marquardt sentenced the same day. See supra notes 28, 153.
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United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in State v. Ring.'61
Because Ring raised an issue that Summerlin raised in both state and
federal petitions, namely the constitutionality of Arizona's death
penalty statute under the Sixth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit panel
withdrew its opinion and deferred submission of the case until after
the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona.162
Thereafter, upon the Supreme Court's issuance of its decision in
Ring, Summerlin moved to stay the circuit court proceedings in order
to ask the Arizona Supreme Court to set aside the mandate in his
direct appeal and consider Ring's effect on his case, but the Arizona
court denied the motion. 63 Thus, in refusing to hear on direct appeal
Summerlin's argument that Ring applied retroactively and invalidated
his death sentence, the Arizona Supreme Court left Summerlin only
one option: to collaterally attack his sentence in his petition for writ
of habeas corpus, still pending before the Ninth Circuit.164 The stage
was thus set for the Ninth Circuit to hold that Ring is available to
death row inmates seeking collateral relief from unconstitutionally
imposed death sentences.
The Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Summerlin's case en banc165
The court issued its divided opinion nearly nine months later and in
doing so, parted company with the other circuits and two states that
have addressed the issue of Ring's retroactive application.' 66 The
Ninth Circuit held that Ring applies retroactively on collateral review
for two reasons. First, because Ring held that sentencing factors ex-
posing a capital defendant to a maximum penalty beyond that which
the jury found "reintroduced 'capital murder' as a separate substan-
161. 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002).
162. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1091 (citing Summerlin, 267 F.3d at 837).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1092 (citing Summerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth
Circuit heard the case on December 10, 2002.
166. E.g., Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that Ring did
not announce a new substantive rule but instead a new procedural rule, extending Apprendi to
capital sentencing, and because it fails to satisfy either Teague exception, Ring does not apply
retroactively on collateral review); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding
that Ring is an extension of Apprendi and is therefore a procedural rule which, because the
petitioner sought relief under a second habeas petition, the Supreme Court must explicitly hold
to apply retroactively); State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (holding that Ring is a new rule
of criminal procedure and does not apply retroactively because it fails to meet either Teague
exception); Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463, 470-73 (Nev. 2002) (Ring does not apply retroactively
on collateral review under a modified Teague test). Contra Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d
1011, 1055 (D. Neb. 2003) (holding that Ring is a substantive rule and applies retroactively on
collateral review).
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tive offense under Arizona law" and redefined the "substantive ele-
ments of this 'separate offense' of capital murder," the Ring rule sub-
stantively changed Arizona law and therefore applies retroactively on
collateral review.67 Second, the Summerlin court held that the Ring
rule satisfies both prongs of the second Teague exception and there-
fore overcomes the presumptive bar against retroactive application of
new criminal procedural rules to cases on collateral review.168 The
following two sections of this Comment will examine in detail both
prongs of the Ninth Circuit's analysis, both of which the Supreme
Court will address on review. 169
IV. RING V. ARIZONA ANNOUNCED A SUBSTANTIVE RULE
The first question before the Supreme Court corresponds to the
first prong of the Ninth Circuit's analysis, in which it departed from
its sister circuits and from state courts addressing the question of
whether Ring applies to habeas petitioners, by holding that Ring an-
nounced more than a new rule of criminal procedure. 170 Thus, the
Supreme Court will first decide whether the Ninth Circuit erred in
holding that Ring announced a substantive rule of law.171
The Summerlin majority first noted the deep-rooted and long-
held presumption that that new constitutional rules will apply retroac-
167. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1106.
168. Id. at 1121.
169. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two out of three questions presented for
review. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003). Arizona asked the Court to decide first
whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that Ring announced a substantive change of law
which is therefore exempt from Teague analysis; and second, asked to Court to answer whether
Ring is a watershed rule of criminal procedure that will greatly increase the chances of an accu-
rate result. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Schriro v. Summerlin (No. 03-526), 2003 WL
22429229 (Sept. 23, 2003). The Court refused to decide the third question presented in Ari-
zona's Petition, specifically whether the Ninth Circuit erred when it applied Ring despite the
aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction, which under Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998), need not be found by a jury. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833.
170. Few Circuits have reached the issue, instead treating Ring as a purely procedural rule
and whether, under Teague the rule applies retroactively on collateral review. However, a few
courts, have considered and rejected arguments that Ring announced a substantive rule. E.g.,
Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.2d 1247, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that because Ring is an exten-
sion of the rule in Apprendi, Ring is purely procedural); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994
(10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting petitioner's argument that Ring announced a substantive rule, hold-
ing instead that as a clear extension of Apprendi, Ring does not apply retroactively); State v.
Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 822-23 (Ariz. 2003) (holding that Ring announced a new procedural rule
rather than a substantive rule, noting that because Apprendi announced a procedural rule,
"logic dictates... [that] Ring ... did also").
171. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833.
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tively,13 2 which presumption was debated after Congress extended
habeas corpus remedies to state prisoners, resulting in a marked in-
crease in the number of federal habeas petitions filed. 73 Tracing the
development of the Teague doctrine and highlighting Justice Harlan's
pivotal role in its development, the majority next turned to Teague's
threshold question of whether Ring is a substantive or procedural
rule.174 Acknowledging the occasional difficulties attending the at-
tempt to distinguish whether a rule is strictly procedural or strictly
substantive, the court offered this distinction: "[A] new rule is one of
'procedure' if it impacts the operation of the criminal trial process,
and a new rule is one of 'substance' if it alters the scope or modifies
the applicability of a substantive criminal statute."75
The court thereafter placed the Ring rule squarely between the
two, holding that Ring announced both a substantive and a proce-
dural rule. 76
A. The Majority's Rationale
According to the Ninth Circuit, Ring "effected a redefinition of
Arizona capital murder law, restoring, as a matter of substantive law,
an earlier Arizona legal paradigm in which murder and capital mur-
der are separate substantive offenses with different essential elements
and different forms of potential punishment." '177 The court arrived at
this conclusion through a detailed examination of the history of capi-
tal sentencing in Arizona, Supreme Court opinions aimed at narrow-
ing the applicability of the death penalty, and its own decisions
interpreting the Arizona capital sentencing scheme. 7 Discussing the
early history of Arizona's capital sentencing statute, the Summerlin
court paid particular attention to the jury's sentencing role through
each incarnation of the statute. 179 With the exception of a two-year
period between 1916 and 1918, the Arizona legislature assigned to the
jury's discretion the decision to impose the death sentence for the
172. The majority cites Justice Holmes' observation that "[j]udicial decisions have had
retrospective operation for near a thousand years." Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1097 (quoting Kuhn
v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
173. Id. at 1097.
174. Id. at 1098-99.
175. Id. at 1100 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
176. Id. at 1101-02.
177. Id. at 1102.
178. Id. at 1102-04.
179. Id. at 1102-03.
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first seventy-one years of the state's capital sentencing scheme. 18° Re-
sponding to the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia181 and
its progeny, 182 the Arizona legislature subsequently amended its death
penalty statutes to assure their constitutionality. First, in 1973, the
legislature added a statutory requirement that a court may not impose
the death penalty without first finding aggravating circumstances and
balancing those against a discrete list of mitigating circumstances.' 3
Second, in 1979 the legislature redefined mitigating circumstances to
include "any factors offered by the state or the defendant which are
relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than
death."184
Following these statutory revisions, the Ninth Circuit reviewed
the use of aggravating circumstances in capital cases and, in Adamson
v. Ricketts,18 held them to constitute elements of the separate offense
of capital murder rather than mere sentencing factors. 186 Notably, the
Supreme Court specifically rejected this argument in Walton, instead
holding that aggravating circumstances "were only 'sentencing con-
siderations,' not 'elements of the offense' of capital murder." '87 Reex-
amining the question of whether aggravating circumstances constitute
sentencing factors or elements of a greater offense twelve years later
in Ring, in light of Apprendi, the Supreme Court overruled that por-
tion of Walton, holding instead that "Arizona's enumerated aggravat-
180. Id. at 1102. Arizona's first capital sentencing statute, Ariz. Territorial Rev. Stat., tit. 8,
§174 (1901), did remove jury discretion in capital sentencing cases in which the defendant pled
guilty. Arizona abolished and restored capital sentencing by referendum in 1916 and 1918,
respectively. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102 (citing Act of Dec. 8, 1916, 1917 Ariz. Session Laws.
Initiative and Referendum Measures, at 4-5 (abolishing) and Act of Dec. 5, 1918, 1919 Ariz.
Session Laws, Initiative and Referendum Measures, at 18 (restoring)).
181. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
182. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) (holding that death penalty statutes must
"genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify
the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (holding that, "in all but the rarest" of
capital cases, sentencers must be allowed to consider as mitigating factors "any aspect of a
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 641-42 (1978)
(holding unconstitutional those death penalty statutes restricting a defendant's right to offer
mitigating circumstances).
183. Id. at 1103 (citing Act of May 14, 1973, ch. 138, § 5, 1973 Ariz. Sess. Laws 966, at 968-
70).
184. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Act of May 1, 1979, ch. 144, § 1, 1979 Ariz. Sess.
Laws 449, at 450-51).
185. 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
186. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1104 (citing Adamson, 865 F.2d at 1026-27).
187. Id. (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)). For a more detailed discus-
sion of Walton, see supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
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ing factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense." ' 188 Given the Court's express overruling of Walton,
the Summerlin majority reasoned that Ring substantively changed
Arizona's death penalty statute, "reintroduc[ing] 'capital murder' as a
separate substantive offense under Arizona law, redefining, in the
process, what the substantive elements of this 'separate offense' of
capital murder are."189
B. Judge Rawlinson's Dissent
The Summerlin dissent faulted what it described as the majority's
flawed syllogism and its attempt to distinguish Ring from Apprendi.tg°
Judge Rawlinson argued that the Ninth Circuit previously held Ap-
prendi to be procedural rather than substantive, and that the majority
could not escape the obvious links between Apprendi and Ring: Ap-
prendi's hate crime aggravating factor and Ring's aggravating factors
both "operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense."1 91 This "creation of a separate substantive offense," accord-
ing to the dissent, does not "render[] a new rule one of substance
rather than procedure for purposes of the Teague analysis, ' 192 merely
because one says so. Thus, the dissent argued, the link between Ap-
prendi and Ring, and the holding that Apprendi is procedural rather
than substantive, are fatal to the majority's argument.
C. Other Courts on Ring as a Substantive Rule
Like the Summerlin dissent, courts rejecting the argument that
Ring announced a substantive rule have relied on the fact that Ring
followed Apprendi, and in doing so applied the Apprendi rule to the
capital sentencing context. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court
held that Ring announced a purely procedural rule, relying on its link
to and extension of Apprendi, and on language within Apprendi ques-
tioning New Jersey's sentencing "procedure.'"1 93 Thus, for example,
188. Id. at 1104-05 (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)).
189. Id. at 1106.
190. Id. at 1125-26 (Rawlinson, J. dissenting).
191. Id. at 112.6 (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609).
192. Id.
193. State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 832-33 (Ariz. 2003) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475)
(emphasis in Towery) (consolidating four capital defendants' post-Ring petitions for relief,
challenging the constitutionality of their sentences based on judicial finding of aggravating
circumstances). The Summerlin majority, in distinguishing Towery, refers to the later Arizona
case of State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915 (2003) as "Ring I1." This is not to be confused with Towery's
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the court in State v. Towery94 notes Apprendi's discussion of an ar-
gument's "bearing on [the] procedural question" of a jury finding that
an aggravating circumstance exists. 195 The Towery court also relied on
various other courts' holdings that Ring announced a procedural
rather than a substantive rule. 196 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit ex-
plained that Apprendi is about nothing but procedure-who decides a
given question (judge versus jury) and under which standard (pre-
ponderance versus reasonable doubt).97 Notably, these courts fail to
address the possibility that Ring is both a procedural and a substan-
tive rule.
D. Analysis
However, not all courts agree, and the Palmer district court's
analysis of Ring as a substantive rule is particularly instructive. By
analogizing to substantive new rules announced in other cases, all of
which have been held retroactive, the Palmer court sets forth a cogent
analysis that can be easily adopted by other courts. The Ninth Circuit
focused on the Arizona statute's role in both Walton and Ring, and on
changes in Arizona's capital sentencing statute, setting Arizona apart
from other jurisdictions and making it more difficult for other juris-
dictions to adopt its analysis. 98 On the other hand, the Palmer court's
approach, compact and straightforward, is not subject to the Summer-
lin dissent's criticism: it explains why the rule creating a distinct capi-
tal murder offense is a substantive rather than a procedural rule. 99
First, the Palmer court acknowledged that if Ring merely stands
for the proposition that all elements must be submitted to a jury for a
factual determination, it indeed directly descends from Apprendi and
could be understood as a purely procedural matter0 However, turn-
ing to the substantive nature of the decision in Ring, Palmer ex-
plained first that new substantive rules are those that "determine the
discussion of Ring II, which the Towery court uses to refer to the United States Supreme Court
decision in Ring v. Arizona.
194. Towery, 64 P.3d 828.
195. Id. at 832.
196. Id. at 832-33.
197. Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2002).
198. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1102-06 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub
nom., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
199. Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1055 (D. Neb. 2003).
200. Id. at 1054. The court does not, however, concede that if analyzed under Teague, Ring
would not surmount its presumptive bar against retroactive application on collateral review.
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meaning of criminal statutes," 0' 1 and "often address the criminal sig-
nificance of certain facts or of the underlying prohibited conduct."2 2
Defining the inquiry of whether a new rule is substantive or proce-
dural as whether the claimed error amounts to a "fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, and
whether it presents exceptional circumstances where the need for the
remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is apparent," the
Palmer court concluded that Ring falls squarely within the category of
substantive rules. 03 Noting the similarity of the substantive-
procedural distinction to the first Teague exception, which allows ret-
roactive application of those rules which place a certain category of
conduct beyond the ability of the legislature to proscribe, the court
explained that decisions altering the definition of a crime must apply
retroactively on habeas review to "mitigate the risk" that a defendant
seeking habeas relief has not been convicted of an act that is no
longer criminal.
2°4
Although at first blush it appears counterintuitive to claim that
Ring creates such a risk, the Palmer court's analysis is sound, and
upon closer consideration the risk posed by denying Ring's retroac-
tive application on collateral review to death row inmates becomes
clear. First, in redefining the elements of murder and capital murder,
the Ring Court created a category of conduct that the capital murder
statute did not reach-murder committed absent any aggravating
circumstances. Thus, by creating two classes of murder, the death
penalty is no longer available for an entire class of capital defendants.
Specifically, the death penalty is no longer available for those defen-
dants in whose trials the judge rather than the jury rendered the ver-
dict as to elemental aggravating circumstances. Further, the decision
in Ring has created an impermissible risk that any number of death
row inmates stand convicted of capital murder, despite the very real
possibility that they are, as the Palmer court describes it, "innocent of
the death penalty," regardless of their guilt or innocence of the under-
lying offense.205 In other words, imposing the death penalty in the face
of a judicial finding of aggravating circumstances compares to a death
201. Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
202. Id. at 1054 (citing Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2002), cert denied,
537 U.S. 976 (2002)).
203. Id. at 1054, 1055 (quoting Davis v. United States, 415 U.S. 333, 345 (1974) (internal
quotations omitted)).
204. Id. at 1053 n.36, 1054 (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 619-21).
205. Id. at 1055-56.
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sentence absent any finding of aggravating circumstances, because the
judicial finding is the equivalent of no finding of aggravating circum-
stances.
Supporting its holding, the Palmer court cited three substantive
new rules analogous to Ring, each of which various courts have held
to apply retroactively on collateral review.206 Important to the analysis
of whether Ring applies retroactively as a substantive rule is the point
on which the cases cited by Palmer are analogous: each clarifies or
articulates elements of an offense. For example, the Palmer court
relied on Richardson v. United States,207 in which the defendant ar-
gued that the continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE") statute under
which he was indicted 28 required a unanimous jury finding not merely
that the defendant engaged in a "series of violations," but also re-
quired a unanimous finding "on which three acts constituted [the]
series of violations. '' 2°9 Explaining its holding, the Court noted that
specific legal consequences attach when it designates "a particular
kind of fact an 'element,"'210 and in Richardson the legal consequence
was that a jury may not convict the defendant absent the Govern-
ment's proof of each element.211 In its analysis, the Court focused on
the jury's role in evaluating and discussing the facts of each violation,
commenting that if each "violation" in the "series" were a means to
establishing a series element rather than an element in and of itself,
the jury could too easily avoid truly deliberating the facts presented
and instead merely gloss over any disagreements among jurors.212
With that in mind, and to assure a fairer and more accurate verdict,
the Court held "that the statute requires jury unanimity in respect to
each individual 'violation'23 constituting the "series of violations. '214
In so holding, the Court clarified the elements of the CCE statute.
206. Id. at 1055 (citing Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 850 (2000); Richardson v.
United States, 526 U.S. 813, 821 (1999); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142 (1995); and
compiling cases holding each new substantive rule to apply retroactively on collateral review).
207. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
208. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (2000).
209. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 816.
210. Id. at 817 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998)).
211. Id. (citing Johnson v. La., 406 U.S. 356, 369-71 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Andres
v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948); and F. R. CRIM. P. 31(a)).
212. Id. at 819.
213. Id. at 824.
214. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A) (2000).
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Similarly, in Bailey v. United States,2 15 the Court explained the
elements necessary to convict a defendant under a statute criminaliz-
ing the use or carrying of a firearm "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime,' ' 21 6 holding that the terms
"use" and "carries". "requires evidence sufficient to show active em-
ployment of the firearm by the defendant."
217
Likewise, the Court in Jones v. United States2 8 (Jones II) again
clarified the elements of a statute.21 9 The statute at issue in Jones II
was a federal arson statute criminalizing the damage or destruction by
fire of "property used in interstate or foreign commerce. '220 Defining
commercial property, the court held that the statute did not reach
arson of purely residential property
221
Because they clarify, explain, or define elements of an offense,
Richardson, Bailey, and Jones II are substantive rules.222 As such, each
applies retroactively on collateral review.23 Thus, the Palmer court
altogether avoids the Summerlin dissent's primary criticism of the
majority's analysis by not merely saying that a rule altering elements
is substantive, but instead pointing to specific examples in which
courts have held similar element-clarifying rules to be substantive and
therefore retroactively applicable on collateral review.
224
Against this background, the Summerlin majority's reliance on
Justice Scalia's opinion in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania225 more clearly
and directly supports the argument that Ring announced a substan-
tive rule.226 Distinguishing capital murder from murder simpliciter, the
Ninth Circuit's analysis is consistent with the Sattazahn Court's analy-
sis, which expressly recognized the distinction between the offenses.
227
Addressing the applicability of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeop-
ardy Clause to capital sentencing proceedings, the Sattazahn Court
215. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
216. 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A) (2000).
217. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 142-43 (1995).
218. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
219. Jones II, 529 U.S. at 850-51.
220. Id. at 850 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §844(i) (2000)).
221. Id. at 850-51.
222. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998).
223. See Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1055 (D. Neb. 2003) (compiling cases hold-
ing Richardson, Bailey, and Jones II retroactive on collateral review).
224. Id.
225. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
226. The Palmer court also relied on Sattazahn to support its holding that Ring announced a
new substantive rule. Palmer, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 1054-55.
227. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 112.
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noted the difficulty of applying the Clause to sentencing proceedings
which, despite the "hallmarks of a trial" they bear, still "dealt only
with the sentence to be imposed for the 'offense' of capital murder.
' '228
Therefore, according to the Court, the rule establishing that jeopardy
attaches where a jury considers the merits of imposing the death sen-
tence and subsequently acquits the defendant in a death sentence
proceeding, "continually tripped over the text of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. 2 29 However, the Court explained that both Apprendi
and Ring clarified its capital sentencing doctrine and eased the diffi-
culty. Restating the Apprendi holding, Justice Scalia explained,
[Apprendi] clarified what constitutes an "element" of an offense for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. Put sim-
ply, if the existence of any fact (other than a prior conviction) in-
creases the maximum punishment that may be imposed on a
defendant, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-constitutes
an element, and must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
230
Likewise, Justice Scalia restated the Court's Ring holding that
"aggravating circumstances that make a defendant eligible for the
death penalty 'operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense.
'' 231
Finally, Justice Scalia noted that for the purposes of the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial, the offenses of "murder" and
"murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances" are distinct
from each other because the offenses expose the defendant to distinct
maximum penalties: life imprisonment and death, respectively.232 For
purposes of Sattazahn, the Court held that this substantive difference
228. Id. at 110 (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 439 (1981)). The Bullington
Court held that double jeopardy applies to capital sentencing proceedings bearing "the hall-
marks of the trial on guilt or innocence," because a trial-like sentencing proceeding subjects the
defendant to emotional stresses and stigma similar to those he or she faces at trial, and because
the sentencing proceeding requires the jury to evaluate whether the prosecution has proven its
case. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439, 444-45.
Sattazahn's first trial resulted in guilty verdicts for, among other charges, first-, second-
and third-degree murder. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103. The jury was unable to reach a unanimous
verdict during its penalty phase deliberation, considering the one aggravating circumstance
presented by the prosecutor and two mitigating circumstances presented by Sattazahn. Id. at
103-04. The trial court therefore discharged the jury and sentenced Sattazahn to life imprison-
ment. Id. at 104-05. Following reversal by the Pennsylvania Superior Court due to erroneous
jury instructions, the prosecution again sought the death penalty. Id. at 105. Sattazahn appealed
to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that Pennsylvania violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause when it sought the death penalty on retrial. Id. at 105.
229. Id.at110-11.
230. Id. at 111 (quoting Apprendi v. N.J., 530 U.S. 466,482-84, 490 (2000)).




between the two offenses is not limited to the Sixth Amendment jury
trial guarantee, but extends to Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy
protection as well. 33 The point remains, though: the Court's explana-
tion of both Apprendi and Ring strongly suggests that the Supreme
Court views Apprendi and Ring as substantive rules.
Thus, those circuits and state courts arguing that Ring merely
"altered who decides whether any aggravating circumstances exist,
thereby altering the fact-finding procedures used in capital sentencing
hearings, ' '234 fail to recognize that Ring also effectively altered what
the factfinder must decide: whether the defendant is guilty of murder
simpliciter or capital murder. Moreover, both Towery and the circuit
and district courts whose cases the Arizona Supreme Court cites
failed to address the possibility that Ring is, as the Ninth Circuit held,
both a procedural and a substantive rule. Although Apprendi dis-
cusses the sentencing procedure, extended to capital sentencing in
Ring, those courts interpreting the cases together ignore the underly-
ing substantive change in both cases, recognized by the Supreme
Court in Sattazahn. And as Summerlin correctly held, Ring reintro-
duced that distinction into capital sentencing law.235 Because it clari-
fied the elements of murder simpliciter and capital murder, Ring is
indeed a substantive rule and therefore applies retroactively on col-
lateral review.
However, Arizona asks the Court to decide whether Ring is a
substantive rule, distinguishable from Apprendi, a case recognized as
purely procedural by most courts considering the question. 23 6 For ex-
ample, the Eleventh Circuit in McCoy v. United States237 held Ap-
prendi to be a procedural rule, rejecting the concurring opinion's
argument and explaining that the Apprendi Court already addressed
the issue.23 The McCoy court explained,
233. Id. 111-12.
234. State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2003) (emphasis in original).
235. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082,1102,1106 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub
nom., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
236. E.g., United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481, 489 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Apprendi
announced a new procedural rule); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 305, 310 (5th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1919 (2003) (rejecting Brown's argument that Apprendi announced
a substantive rule, instead, holding that Apprendi was purely procedural); Curtis v. United
States, 294 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 976 (2002) (explaining that Ap-
prendi is concerned only with the "identity of the decision-maker, and the quantum of evidence
required for a sentence, rather than with what primary conduct is unlawful," and holding that
Apprendi therefore announced a procedural rather than a substantive new rule).
237. 266 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2001).
238. Id. at 1257 n.16.
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In Apprendi, the Supreme Court specifically noted that "[t]he sub-
stantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement... is not at issue; the
adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is." The application of Ap-
prendi merely changes the method or procedure for determining
drug quantity and [the defendant's] sentence; it does not make [the
defendant's] conduct not criminal, thereby raising the spectre of ac-
tual innocence... Thus, as other circuits have, we conclude Ap-
prendi announced a new rule of criminal procedure. 239
However, the Eleventh Circuit takes out of context the language
from Apprendi: rather than discussing the substantive or procedural
nature of the holding, the Apprendi Court instead addressed the con-
stitutionality of using racial bias as an aggravating circumstance.
24°
And while it is true that the Apprendi Court discussed the rule in a
procedural context, 241 it did not do so in a manner foreclosing the pos-
sibility that the rule is also substantive.
In fact, the Supreme Court has not specifically held Apprendi to
be substantive or procedural, and should not rely on circuit and state
courts' interpretation of Apprendi as purely procedural to answer
whether the rule announced in Ring is substantive or procedural. Al-
though there is a strong argument that the cases are inextricably
linked, with Ring merely extending Apprendi's rule into the capital
sentencing context, their similarity does not answer the critical ques-
tion: are both Apprendi and Ring substantive or procedural rules?
Both are substantive rules, because both Apprendi and Ring alter the
elements of the offenses. Apprendi makes the choice of victim based
on race (here the hate crime aggravating circumstance, although dif-
ferent cases present different aggravating circumstances) an element
of a different offense, eligible for a greater sentence, while Ring
makes an aggravating circumstance an element of a different offense,
eligible for a greater sentence. Both Apprendi and Ring therefore
alter not only who must decide the defendant's guilt, they alter what
the decisionmaker must decide. If the jury fails to find the defendant
guilty of the greater offense, the defendant is simply not guilty of that
offense.242 Thus, the jury's finding is not merely one that a defendant
239. Id. (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000)).
240. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475.
241. Id. ("The strength of the state interests that are served by the hate crime legislation has
no more bearing on this procedural question than the strength of the interests served by other
provisions of the criminal code.").
242. Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1055-56 (D. Neb. 2003) (citing Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1992)).
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is eligible for a particular sentence, but is instead one of either guilty
or not guilty of a distinct offense.
2 43
Therefore, because Ring defines the elements of an offense and
announces a substantive rule of law, it is not subject to Teague's ret-
roactivity analysis. Moreover, because the Summerlin court correctly
held that Ring announced a substantive rule, the Supreme Court
should affirm the Ninth Circuit's holding that the rule applies retroac-
tively on collateral review.
V. RING V. ARIZONA ANNOUNCED A NEW RULE OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
In addition to finding that Ring announced a substantive rule, the
Summerlin majority also found that as a new criminal procedural rule,
Ring satisfies the Teague doctrine's second exception and should
therefore apply retroactively on collateral review.244 Agreeing with
other courts that have considered Teague's bearing on Ring, the court
held that Ring is indeed a new rule.2 45 However, the Ninth Circuit
parted company with other circuits when it correctly held that, be-
cause Ring is a "watershed rule" which "defines structural safeguards
implicit in our concept of ordered liberty that are necessary to protect
the fundamental fairness of capital murder trials, 2 46 it overcomes the
243. See id. at 1055-56 (noting that a capital defendant can be guilty of the underlying of-
fense but "innocent" of the death penalty).
244. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub
noma., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
245. The Ninth Circuit rejected Summerlin's argument that relied on the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), (holding that Arizona
law defined two levels of murder, for one of which the aggravating factors were elements of
capital murder). In 1984, Summerlin had raised an argument similar to that in Adamson, which
argument the Arizona Supreme Court rejected based on the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding that the constitution did not require
jury sentencing in capital murder proceedings). Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109.
246. Id. at 1121. The court briefly addressed the first Teague exception, noting cursorily that
it does not apply to Ring. Id. at 1109. The United States Supreme Court in Saffle v. Parks held
that the first Teague exception also encompasses new rules that "address[] a 'substantive cate-
gorical guarante[e] accorded by the Constitution,' such as... a rule prohibiting a certain cate-
gory of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense." Saffle, 494 U.S.
484, 494 (1990) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989)). However, Janice L. Kopec
argues that Ring satisfies the first Teague exception by converting the offense of capital murder
into two separate offenses: capital murder which may result in a sentence of life and capital
murder which may result in a sentence of death, depending on whether the prosecutor proves
the elements to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the offense of capital murder with
unproven aggravating circumstances "creates a class of defendants against whom a certain
category of punishment, death, is now prohibited." Janice L. Kopec, Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct.
2428 (2002) and Allen v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2653 (2002), 15 CAP. DEF. J. 143, 149 (2002).
As explained previously, this argument is better suited to the Summerlin court's holding that
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Teague hurdles and therefore applies retroactively on collateral re-
view. 247 The second question before the Supreme Court corresponds
to this second prong of the Ninth Circuit's analysis, as the Court will
decide whether the Summerlin majority erred in holding that Ring
satisfied Teague's requirements.2 48 This Section will first discuss the
majority and dissent positions on each prong of the Teague exception,
and will briefly examine other courts' conclusions that Ring fails to
satisfy the exception. This Section will then conclude by confirming
the jury's role in substantially increasing the likelihood of an accurate
result and the Summerlin court's conclusion that Ring is indeed a wa-
tershed rule.
A. The Requirement that a Jury Find All Facts Substantially In-
creases the Likelihood of an Accurately Imposed Death Penalty
As noted above, to qualify as an exception under Teague, a new
rule must first be one that "significantly improve[s] the pre-existing
fact-finding procedures ' 249 to "seriously enhance the accuracy of the
proceeding.2 0 Noting that sentencing proceedings are analogous to
trials in their considerations of guilt or innocence, and that jeopardy
attaches when a jury considers and rejects the imposition of the death
penalty (thereby precluding its use in a subsequent prosecution), 251
the Summerlin majority concluded that the accuracy to which Teague
refers applies equally to the guilt and the penalty phases. 252 Relying
on Sawyer v. Smith,253 the majority argued that Ring satisfies Teague's
accuracy requirement "on its face. ' '254 A brief summary of Sawyer will
clarify the Summerlin court's reliance on the case.
Ring issued a substantive rule of law which defined the elements of the crime because the class
of individuals for whom a certain category of punishment is now prohibited are unidentifiable as
members of the class until after their sentencing proceedings. In fact, some courts treat the
substantive-procedural distinction as the first Teague exception. See Palmer, 293 F. Supp. 2d at
1053 n.36.
247. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121.
248. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
249. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312 (1989) (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
262 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
250. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109 (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
251. Id. at 1110 (quoting Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 107 (2003)).
252. Id.
253. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
254. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1110.
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Sawyer sought the benefit of a new rule on collateral review, ar-
guing that the rule preserved a proceeding's accuracy and fairness.255
The rule at issue was that in Caldwell v. Mississippi,2 56 in which the
Court held that because of the potential unreliability and bias favor-
ing death sentences, the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury con-
sidering a capital sentence not be misled to believe that it is not
responsible "for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's
capital sentence. 2 57 Although the Court rejected the petitioner's ar-
gument and refused to apply the rule retroactively, its decision was
not because the rule sought failed to increase the likelihood of an
accurate result. Instead, the Sawyer Court held that the Caldwell rule
failed to satisfy the second prong of the Teague exception." 8 Impor-
tantly, in explaining its reasons for refusing to hold the rule as a bed-
rock principle, the Sawyer Court noted that if it accepted the
petitioner's argument that the rule should apply retroactively because
of its accuracy-enhancing quality, all of the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence should apply retroactively because it is all "di-
rected toward the enhancement of reliability and accuracy in some
sense."25 9 Allowing such extensive retroactive application would de-
feat the very purpose of the Teague doctrine and its underlying cost-
benefit balancing.216
Unlike Sawyer, Ring is grounded in the Sixth Ameidment rather
than the Eighth Amendment. However, despite the distinction, the
Supreme Court's warning that merely enhancing reliability and accu-
racy fails to satisfy the second Teague exception is instructive. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit established at great lengths the degree to which
submitting aggravating and mitigating factors to a capital sentencing
jury increases the likelihood of an accurate result. For example, the
majority noted that presenting evidence to prove the existence of
aggravating factors to a jury rather than a judge assures a more or-
derly, thorough, and formal presentation and also assures that prose-
cutors do not submit inadmissible evidence, which they later expect
255. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242.
256. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
257. Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233 (citing Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29).
258. Id. at 242, 243.
259. Id. at 243.
260. Id. at 242-43 (noting that the retroactivity cost-benefit analysis generally favors non-
retroactivity).
[Vol 79:755
SUMMERLIN V. STEWART AND RING RETROACTIVITY
the trier of fact to ignore.2 61 Additionally, the Summerlin majority
explained the jury's role in determining whether the prosecution has
proven aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt greatly in-
creases the likelihood of an accurate result because, "as a microcosm
of the community," the factfinder must use current community values
and standards by which to evaluate some of the more subjective ag-
gravating factors. 262 Finally, the Ninth Circuit voiced two concerns
regarding capital sentencing judges: first, they are likely to be more
accustomed than the average juror to death penalty issues, and there-
fore less likely to truly reflect the community's views on the death
penalty as an extraordinary measure; and second, judges facing re-
election face political pressure to impose the death penalty.
263
However, Judge Rawlinson, writing for the dissent, claimed that
it is far from clear whether requiring that a jury determine the exis-
tence of aggravating circumstances in capital cases will enhance the
accuracy of a capital sentencing proceeding.264 In reaching this conclu-
sion, he attacked the majority for ignoring evidence that juries often
make the death penalty decision before reaching the sentencing
phase, and that jurors who are undecided are more likely to vote for
death. 265 Moreover, the dissent rejected the majority's contention that
formal and thorough jury presentations are likely to be more accurate
than a presentation to a judge, countering that in fact such presenta-
tions confuse juries, who do not provide "necessarily the fairest adju-
dication for a capital defendant" in their role as the "conscience of
the community. '2 66 Turning to the majority's concern that judicial
experience with capital sentencing renders judges more jaded and less
affected by imposing the sentence, the dissent posited that judges'
experience with capital sentencing might benefit a capital defen-
dant.2 67 Addressing the majority's final concern with judicial sentenc-
ing and its effect on the accuracy of the verdict, the dissent assailed
the majority's data, and noted that juries are also subject to pres-
sure.268 Thus, arguing that Ring fails to satisfy even the first prong of
261. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub
nom., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
262. Id. at 1113-14 (quoting Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
263. Id. at 1114.
264. Id. at 1131.
265. Id. at 1129-31.
266. Id. at 1130-31.




the Teague exception, the dissent claimed that the rule should not
apply retroactively.2 69 Before discussing the correctness of the major-
ity's analysis, this Comment will first explain both the majority and
dissent positions, as well as the concurrence, regarding Ring's satisfac-
tion of the Teague exception's second prong.
B. The Requirement that a Jury Must Find all Facts Necessary to
Impose a Death Sentence is a "Bedrock Principle, " "Implicit in Our
Concept of Ordered Liberty"
Having satisfied the accuracy prong of the Teague exception, a
new procedural rule will apply retroactively if it "alter[s] our under-
standing of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to
vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction. ' 27 0 To establish that
Ring meets this requirement, the Summerlin majority began by hold-
ing that Ring error is structural rather than harmless error because
the error, "[d]epriving a capital defendant of his constitutional right
to have a jury decide whether he is eligible for the death penalty[,] is
an error that necessarily affects the framework within which the trial
proceeds."271
According to Summerlin, presenting to a judge aggravating cir-
cumstances, which are in fact elements of a capital crime, results in
structural error because "an improperly constituted or situated tribu-
nal reaches a decision, [and] that decision is infected with a 'plain
defect' and must be vacated. '272
Having established Ring error as structural rather than harmless
error, the majority continued its analysis, likening Ring to Furman in
269. Id.
270. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (em-
phasis in Teague).
271. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1116 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991));
Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1119 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999)).
272. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1118 (quoting Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130, 2137-38
(2003), and citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83-85 (1982)).
However, the Supreme Court in Tyler v. Cain cautioned that merely classifying an error
as structural error does not fulfill the requirements of the second Teague exception. Tyler v.
Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666-67 (2001). Thus, the Tyler Court rejected an argument that when it held
the error under the rule announced in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), was structural
error, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282-83 (1993), Cage thereby satisfied the second
Teague exception and applied retroactively on collateral review. Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665-67.
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its far-reaching structural effect on capital trials.2 3 The majority ex-
plained that the Ring Court "declar[ed] that judges are constitution-
ally unqualified to decide whether a defendant is eligible for the
death penalty," 274 and affected nearly one-fourth of then-existing capi-
tal murder statutes.275 Given its structural nature and the extent of its
impact, the court continued, Ring is in fact a watershed rule that
"fundamentally altered our view of how the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial affected the Eighth Amendment's requirement that
state statutes narrow the class of individuals eligible for the penalty of
death. '276 Therefore, according to Summerlin, Ring should apply ret-
roactively on collateral review.
Judge Reinhardt's concurrence focused on the unique nature of
the punishment at issue, specifically noting the arbitrariness of deny-
ing capital defendants the benefit of Ring because the judgment in
their cases became final prior to the Court's decision. 277 He likened
Ring, as a correction of Walton's "error," to Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation278 as a correction of the Court's error in constitutional interpre-
tation in Plessy v. Ferguson.27 9 Importantly, Judge Reinhardt pointed
out that a number of the habeas petitioners for whom the dissent
would deny the rule of Ring would not have been sentenced under
unconstitutional methods absent the Court's initial error in interpret-
ing the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.280 Given the inargu-
able fact that "death is different, '281 Reinhardt questioned whether
the society should allow a state to "deliberately execute persons
knowing that their death sentences were arrived at in a manner that
violated their constitutional rights?" 282
273. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1119-20. The court notes that Ring will affect "the structure of
every capital trial and has rendered unconstitutional every substantive statute in conflict with its
dictates." Id. at 1119.
274. Id. at 1120.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
278. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
279. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
280. Id. at 1122 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
281. Id. at 1123 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606
(2002); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430
U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
282. Id. at 1124 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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This dissent summarily criticized the majority's treatment of Ring
as not subject to harmless error analysis, relying on a footnote to Ring
in which the Court noted its failure to reach the harmless error issue,
leaving it instead to the Arizona courts.2 83 The Ring footnote, taken
with what the dissent described as Ring's limited applicability (be-
cause so few states remained whose capital sentencing laws did not
require juries to find every aggravating factor/element) led the dissent
to conclude that Ring therefore is not a watershed rule.2 84
C. Other Courts on Ring's Retroactive Application under Teague
Other courts analyzing Ring's retroactivity as a procedural rule
likewise have concluded that Ring is not a watershed rule and there-
fore does not apply retroactively. For example, the Eleventh Circuit
in Turner v. Crosby2 85 explained that an impartial factfinder consid-
ered the aggravating circumstance element pre-Ring as well as post-
Ring. 86 According to the court, the only difference was the identity of
that factfinder.2 87 The Turner court further explained that Ring's basis
in the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury precluded the possibil-
ity that Ring is based on a "need to enhance accuracy or fairness of
the fact-finding in a capital sentencing context." '288
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that Ring fails to satisfy
Teague's narrow exceptions. For example, the court in Cannon v.
Mullin289 considered Ring's retroactive application to a habeas peti-
tion governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA").290 Under AEDPA, an applicant filing a second or suc-
cessive habeas petition, relying on a new constitutional rule, must
demonstrate that the Supreme Court has made the rule "retroactive
283. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1127, 1131 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at
609 n.7). Arizona courts subject Ring error to harmless error analysis. State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915,
936 (Ariz. 2003).
284. Id. 1131-32 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
285. 339 F.3d 1247 (llth Cir. 2003).
286. Id. at 1286.
287. Id. Turner was convicted in Florida, which used a 'hybrid' capital sentencing scheme.
The jury found Turner guilty of two counts of first-degree murder on August 16, 1985. Id. at
1261. Following the penalty phase, the jury rendered advisory sentences, recommending a
"sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years" for one
murder, and recommending the death penalty for the other murder. Id. at 1265. Thereafter, the
trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and on November 1, 1985 sentenced Turner in accor-
dance with the jury's recommendations. Id. at 1267.
288. Id. at 1286.
289. 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002).
290. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 et seq. (2000).
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to cases on collateral review."2 91 The Supreme Court in Tyler v.
Cain292 interpreted this provision of AEDPA, holding that it must
either explicitly hold a rule retroactive, or in the case of two cases
combining to hold a rule retroactive, if "the holdings in those cases
necessarily dictate retroactivity of the new rule. ' 293 Cannon argued
that the Supreme Court has already held Ring to apply retroactively
on collateral review. 294 The Tenth Circuit rejected Cannon's argument
that through Teague, Ring, and the "Apprendi line" of cases the Su-
preme Court had effectively held that Ring applies retroactively on
collateral review. 295 While the Cannon court's analysis appeared to
leave open the possibility that Ring applies retroactively to habeas
petitions not subject to AEDPA's strict requirements, the Tenth Cir-
cuit has since conclusively held that Ring does not apply retroactively
on collateral review. 296
D. Analysis
Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the rule requiring that a
jury rather than a judge decide every element of capital murder sub-
stantially increases the likelihood of an accurate result. Further, the
error in a pre-Ring trial is structural, and Ring's impact profound,
altering our understanding of the bedrock elements necessary for a
fair conviction of capital murder. Therefore, just as the Supreme
Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit's holding that Ring announced
a substantive rule which applies retroactively on collateral review, the
Court should likewise affirm Summerlin's holding that Ring an-
nounced a watershed rule that satisfies the second Teague exception.
The Ninth Circuit's analysis is sound. The rule announced in
Ring is truly a watershed rule, because it enhances both accuracy and
fundamental fairness in capital trials. These accuracy and fundamen-
tal fairness prongs of the Teague exception are interrelated in the jury
context. Specifically, the history of the jury's role in American juris-
prudence demonstrates that the jury was designed to both increase
291. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000).
292. 533 U.S. 656 (2001).
293. Id. at 663, 666.
294. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 992 (10th Cir. 2002). Cannon filed an Emergency
Application for Stay of Execution and Emergency Motion for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(A) for Permission to File a Second Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief Under §
2254. Id. at 990.
295. Id. at 992-93.
296. See e.g., Workman v. Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003).
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accuracy in criminal trials and to protect a proceeding's fundamental
fairness. This analysis will first discuss the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of the fundamental protections offered by the jury and its con-
cern that the increased use of sentencing factors marks a troubling
departure from that valued tradition. Thereafter, the analysis will
focus on how the use of the jury increases the likelihood of a more
accurate result. Finally, this Comment will conclude by suggesting
that holding that Ring applies retroactively on collateral review is
consistent with the principles underlying the Teague doctrine.
Ring does indeed satisfy the prerequisites to retroactive applica-
tion on collateral review. The case culminates a line of cases wherein
the Court reemphasized the jury's fundamental factfinding role with
respect to all elements, regardless of whether the state refers to those
elements as sentencing factors. First, analyzing Ring in the context
not only of Apprendi, but of Walton and Jones as well, reveals the
Court's increasing awareness and concern that the states devalued the
jury's role in criminal trials. This devaluation diminished the fairness
of those trials, which has long been recognized as a primary purpose
of the Sixth Amendment. 29 7 In response, and after recognizing that
the increased use of judicially determined sentencing factors marked
a departure from allowing the jury to play its fundamental role as the
buffer between the defendant and the state, the Supreme Court thus
reshaped its sentencing jurisprudence.
The Court's concern that states not use "sentencing factors" to
skirt the protections of the Sixth Amendment is clear in Jones, the
first of the post-Walton cases in the Apprendi line. The Jones Court
devoted several paragraphs to describing the jury's traditional and
fundamental role in American jurisprudence 8.2 9  The Jones Court
noted that juries in the English system traditionally considered "lesser
included offenses" to thwart parliamentary and royal power.299 The
parliamentary response of attempting to restrict juries' ability to con-
trol the outcome of trials must certainly have been in the constitu-
tional framers' mind.30 In fact, the Jones Court noted that colonial
297. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942)
("[P]rocedural devices rooted in experience were written into the Bill of Rights not as abstract
rubrics in an elegant code but in order to assure fairness and justice before any person could be
deprived of 'life, liberty or property.').
298. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244-48 (1999).
299. Id. at 245 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
238-39 (1769)).
300. Id. Professor Reid notes that to colonists, "[p]arliament's claim, to have the constitu-
tional power to alter the fundamental right of trial by jury and to sweep aside a provincial char-
[Vol 79:755
SUMMERLIN V. STEWART AND RING RETROACTIVITY
Americans understood "that the jury right could be lost not only by
gross denial, but by erosion. ' 301
Following Jones, the Apprendi Court again expressed concern
that sentencing factors eroded the jury's fundamental role, noting that
"the historical foundation for our recognition of these principles ex-
tends down centuries into the common law."3°2 The Court explained
that trial on every element of an accusation was central to our inher-
ited jury system, and during the country's formative years, "[a]ny pos-
sible distinction between an 'element' of a felony offense and a
'sentencing factor' was unknown to the practice of criminal indict-
ment, trial by jury, and judgment by court. ' 30 3 The issue of whether to
allow a sentencing judge to make factual findings about elements was
thus one of "surpassing importance,"3 °4 which the Court held to be an
"unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensa-
ble part of our criminal justice system."3 5 Moreover, the Court sug-
gested that rather than issuing a novel rule of criminal procedure by
which it requires that a jury determine what were traditionally con-
sidered merely sentencing factors, it was in fact displacing a novel
legislative approach and requiring a return to a bedrock principle:
The historic link between verdict and judgment and the consistent
limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of the
legal penalties provided highlight the novelty of a legislative
scheme that removes the jury from the determination of a fact that,
if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the
maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts re-
flected in the jury verdict alone.3°6
In fact, four Apprendi dissenters predicted that Apprendi would
"surely be remembered as a watershed change in constitutional
law."1307
ter with all its customary and historical rights and privileges, meant slavery by legislative author-
ity." JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 96 (1988) (internal quotation omitted).
301. Jones, 526 U.S. at 247-48.
302. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (citing 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 299, at 343).
303. Id. at 478.
304. Id. at 476.
305. Id. at 497; see also GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787: A
COMMENTARY 146 (1989) ("Trial by jury reflects substantial popular control over judges.").
306. Apprendi, 533 U.S. at 482-83 (emphasis in original).
307. Id. at 524 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For further discussion of Ap-
prendi as a watershed ruling, see e.g., Heather Jones, Note, Apprendi v. New Jersey: A True
"Watershed" Ruling, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1377 (2003) ("Because Apprendi did redefine what
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The Apprendi line of cases preceding Ring, taken together with
the Court's attention to the jury's traditional role in criminal trials,
present a framework within which the rule protecting the jury's role
as factfinder, especially in the capital sentencing context, is in fact a
bedrock principle. This is true for the rule in Apprendi and it is for
the rule in Ring. In fact, it is precisely in matters of life and death that
the jury must play its traditional role-bringing community standards
into the deliberations and protecting against the possibility of an un-
duly harsh sentence. Indeed, no defendant is more in need of a jury to
safeguard his or her liberty against the potential abuse of prosecuto-
rial power or the arbitrary decision of a sole judge than one facing a
sentence of death. The Supreme Court in Ring halted the legislative
erosion of the Sixth Amendment's guarantees, and in doing so "al-
ter[ed] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essen-
tial to the fairness of a proceeding"3°8 by declaring that it will permit
neither legislative convenience nor presumed superiority of judgment
to deny a criminal defendant a jury trial on every element of the
charged offense.
Having established that Ring altered our understanding of bed-
rock procedural elements, the Summerlin court also correctly held
that Ring substantially increased the likelihood of an accurate re-
sult.309 The jury has historically acted as the conscience of the com-
munity, placing itself as a buffer between an accused and the full
power and authority of the state. This is precisely why the Sixth
Amendment jury trial guarantee is so important. Representing the
community, the jury must weigh all of the evidence presented and
reach a unanimous verdict as to whether the prosecutor has estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt each element of capital murder. It
must be noted that to recognize that a jury substantially increases
accuracy is not to say that judges are inevitably inaccurate. Instead, it
recognizes that twelve people discussing and evaluating whether evi-
dence proves inherently subjective elements are more likely to reach
an accurate result than a lone judge considering the same evidence.
And indeed, aggravating circumstance elements are highly subjective.
The subjectivity is readily apparent in examining one of Summerlin's
is essential to the fairness of criminal proceedings, it should be considered a watershed deci-
sion.").
308. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311
(1989) (plurality opinion) (internal quotations omitted, emphasis in original)).
309. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part sub
nom., Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
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aggravating circumstances: whether Summerlin committed his crime
in an "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner."3 10 Certainly the
likelihood of an accurate result increases when twelve people, each
bringing to the process different worldviews and experiences, con-
sider such a subjective element. Jurors' definitions of "heinous,"
"cruel," and "depraved" will likely vary, and the jury's unanimous
verdict will thus better reflect community opinions and values regard-
ing whether it is appropriate to impose the death penalty for the of-
fense. Moreover, despite the dissent's dismissal of the jury's role as
the conscience of the community, the Supreme Court has expressly
recognized that role.3"
Thus, allowing a jury to consider and evaluate facts and evidence
substantially increases the likelihood of an accurate result. However,
the jury's role in enhancing accuracy is also closely linked to its role in
preserving the fundamental fairness of a criminal trial. As Professor
Barkow explains, criminal juries, with their ability to render a verdict
of guilty or not guilty, "have the kind of ameliorative power Aristotle
deemed critical for producing equitable results."3 2 The equity to
which Professor Barkow refers also assures a more accurate result,
especially in the capital sentencing context, when weighing such sub-
jective factors as the heinous nature of an offense. The jury must bal-
ance the evidence against the alleged elemental aggravating
circumstance, and render a value-laden judgment about whether the
defendant should be put to death for his or her crime. When a defen-
dant's life hangs in the balance, the only accurate result is an equita-
ble one-one in which the jury of twelve rather than a lone judge
plays its constitutionally required role.
Finally, despite the dissent's casual dismissal of the Summerlin
majority's concern that judges will be either hardened to the consid-
erations surrounding the imposition of the death penalty or will face
310. Id. at 1090 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(F)(6) (1981) (amended in 1993)).
311. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 (1999); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519-20 (1968) (explaining that jurors must act as the community's conscience, bringing
to the deliberations their views on the suitability of capital punishment); Recent Cases, Criminal
Procedure-Habeas Corpus-Ninth Circuit Holds That the Supreme Court's Decision in Ring v.
Arizona Applies Retroactively to Cases on Habeas Corpus Review-Summerlin v. Stewart, 341
F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), 117 HARV. L. REV. 1291, 1297-98 (2004) (arguing that the
9th Circuit should have focused on the jury's role as the conscience of the community, thereby
enhancing "procedural accuracy").
312. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 36 (2003) (citing ARISTOTLE,




political pressure, the concern is valid and longstanding. In fact, con-
cerns about judicial acclimation date to the Bill of Rights, as evi-
denced by Thomas Jefferson's reflection:
In truth, it is better to toss up cross and pile [heads or tail] in a
cause, than to refer it to a judge whose mind is warped by any mo-
tive whatever, in that particular case. But the common sense of
twelve honest men gives still a better chance of just decision, than
the hazard of cross and pile.3"3
Indeed, the Court has long recognized the jury's role in assuring that
the community may "guard against the exercise of arbitrary power"
and afford the defendant the benefit of its "commonsense judg-
ment... as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-conditioned or
biased response of a judge."' 4
Finally, reexamining Justice Harlan's explanation of the rule con-
firms that Ring satisfies the requirements of a "watershed rule."
Harlan explained that a watershed rule is one which alters our under-
standing of bedrock elements, resulting from "time and growth in
social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly
demand of the adjudicatory process." '315 Surely the decision that the
Sixth Amendment requires that a capital defendant receive a trial
before a jury on both the issue of factual guilt of the underlying crime
and of the elemental aggravating factors reflects growing uncertainty
surrounding capital punishment in recent years, and indeed the in-
creasing numbers of Americans opposed to the death penalty.316 The
recent shift in public attitudes has been described as nothing less than
"a sea change. '317 As societal perception and acceptance of capital
313. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Notes on the State of Virginia (1781-1785), in THE COMPLETE
JEFFERSON 567, 656 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943) (1785).
314. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
155-56 (1968)).
315. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 289,311 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (em-
phasis in Teague).
316. Professor Carol Streiker notes that the Court's new position on capital sentencing
jurisprudence "reflects a recent and more widespread cultural and political shift in popular
attitudes and concerns about the death penalty." Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the
Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1477 (2002).
Steiker argues that "the shift in public attitudes has its roots.., in the erosion of public confi-
dence in the existence of extensive safeguards surrounding the rse of capital punishment in our
country." Id. at 1482-83.
317. Id. at 1483. Professor Steiker cites the passage or pendency of "[a] wide variety of
legislation reforming the capital process to better protect the innocent," evidence in public polls
of dramatically decreased "public support for capital punishment," and "substantial" support
for a "moratorium on executions until problems in the system can be studied and remedied." Id.
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punishment shift, so too will jurors' evaluation of such subjective ag-
gravating factors as whether a crime was committed in a particularly
heinous manner sufficient to warrant imposing the ultimate penalty.
VI. RING V. ARIZONA SHOULD APPLY RETROACTIVELY ON
COLLATERAL REVIEW
The Ninth Circuit correctly held that Ring applies retroactively
on collateral review, both as a substantive and procedural rule. First,
Ring clarified the elements of murder simpliciter and capital murder,
and by requiring a jury verdict on every element of capital murder
before rendering a capital defendant eligible for the death penalty,
the Supreme Court "address[ed] the criminal significance of certain
facts."3 8 As such, this substantive rule of law, similar to those an-
nounced in Richardson, Bailey, and Jones II, is not subject to the
Teague analysis and applies retroactively on collateral review. Addi-
tionally, as a procedural rule Ring overcomes the Teague hurdles to
retroactive application on collateral review, because by reaffirming
the jury's traditional role in criminal trials, Ring announced a water-
shed rule that fundamentally alters our understanding of bedrock
elements necessary for a fair trial. In short, the Ring Court altered
both who decides a capital defendant's eligibility for the death pen-
alty, restoring to the jury its role as the conscience of the community,
and also altered what the jury must decide.
The Court should therefore affirm the Ninth Circuit's holding.
Applying Ring retroactively on habeas review is wholly consistent
with the purposes of habeas corpus and indeed with the Teague doc-
trine's concern that judgments must at some point become final. As
Justice Harlan explained,
No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society
as a whole is benefited by a judgment providing that a man shall
tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter
his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on is-
sues already resolved.3" 9
This concern is inapplicable in the context of Ring and its retro-
active application. Ring's retroactive application will affect a discrete
number of capital defendants, for whom the benefit of Ring will not
318. Palmer v. Clarke, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1054 (D. Neb. 2003) (citing Curtis v. United
States, 294 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 976 (2002)).
319. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 691 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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result in fresh litigation. At most it will result in a new sentencing
hearing, which does not implicate the concerns about stale evidence
and places only a minimal burden on state resources. Moreover, soci-
ety does benefit from Ring's retroactive application on collateral re-
view, whether under Teague or simply in accordance with the
principles of collateral review: allowing criminal defendants the bene-
fit of a jury's finding that the defendant is eligible for the death pen-
alty assures that society fulfills its civic and political role, that it shares
the burden of imposing the death penalty, and that such penalty re-
flects the opinion of a representative section of the community rather
than the discretion of one person sitting in judgment on another.
